Buffalo Law Review
Volume 12

Number 1

Article 55

10-1-1962

Torts—Exemplary Damages Awarded in Fraud and Deceit Action
James P. Manak

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
James P. Manak, Torts—Exemplary Damages Awarded in Fraud and Deceit Action, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 201
(1962).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol12/iss1/55

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
doer. However, experience shows that fault is not always in one individual;
in fact, it is usually shared. In such circumstances financial losses ought also
to be shared. This could be done by allowing contribution in all cases where
there is concurrent negligence. Necessarily such action would have to be taken
by the Legislature because the existing statute allowing contribution has been
so narrowly construed. 8 In the instant case the sub-contractor's negligence was
the immediate cause of the injury to the infant plaintiff. The failure of the
infant plaintiff to join the sub-contractor defeated any possibility of contractor's
obtaining contribution, and the Court's determination that contractor was
actively negligent made indemnification impossible. Thus one of the primary
wrongdoers escaped, undamaged financially. The need for a broader contribution statute is painfully apparent. Contribution closely approaches a distribution of losses according to fault, and this ought to be the goal of any
R. J. D.
legal system.
ExEM LARY DAMAGES AWARDED IN FRAUD AND DECEIT ACTION

Although it has long been the rule in New York State that punitive damages
will not lie in cases of "ordinary" fraud and deceit, a recent Court of Appeals
decision has opened the door to such damages in cases where the public in
general has been the victim of illegitimate enterprises based upon fraud and
deception. As a result, the argument has been raised that the old rule has
been extended in a direction not supported by precedent, or within the tra1
ditional role of the judiciary. The question arises in Walker v. Sheldon, an
action against a publishing firm and its officers.
Plaintiff wished to publish a book of children's stories written by her
mother, a non-professional writer. She was offered a contract wherein the
defendants promised to print 2,400 copies of the book and promote their sale
through the use of their alleged advertising and sales staff. The sum of $1,380
was to be paid by plaintiff for the printing, but it was represented that as a
result of the promised promotional scheme, "liberal" royalties would result in the
plaintiff recouping this amount. The complaint alleged that in fact the defendant never intended to publish the book in the sense represented by the contract
or that understood among professional writers. Instead, the defendants intended to and did publish no more than a handful of the books to meet a
minimal demand for them by plaintiff's friends and relatives, and the copies
were sold in book shops in plaintiff's neighborhood only, with "advertising"
limited to a token listing in an obscure local newspaper. It was further alleged
that the defendants calculated their profit from the contract on this minimal
8. See 1952 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Report 21; 1941 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Report
17; 1939 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Report 67; 1936 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Report 699. The
Commission in vain recommended to the Legislature a broadening of the right of contribution.
1.

10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
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effort, not on the sale of the books as promised, and that their representations
were wantonly and recklessly made in order to defraud the plaintiff as others had
been similarly defrauded, and that such was the basis of the defendant's business and in its regular course. Plaintiff therefore sought $75,000 punitive
damages in addition to compensatory damages of $1,380.
The defendants moved to strike those paragraphs of the complaint alleging
that the representations were made in its regular course of business, and as
its basis, and that other members of the general public had been similarly
defrauded in the past. The Supreme Court, New York County, Special Term,
denied this motion and the Appellate Division affirmed.2 The allegations in the
complaint relating to punitive damages were allowed to stand. Defendants
appealed by permission upon certification of questions whether the Appellate
Division acted properly as a matter of law.
The majority of the Court of Appeals, concurring in the opinion of Judge
Fuld, agreed with the conclusion of the Appellate Division that a jury would
be justified in granting punitive damages to the plaintiff on the theory of
wanton and malicious conduct if the defendants were found to be carrying on a
"virtually larcenous scheme to trap generally the unwary." 3 It has been the
practice in New York to confine damages in fraud and deceit actions to a
compensatory rather than an exemplary assessment. The case of Oehlhoj v.
Solomon 4 is illustrative of this rule which has refused punitive damages in
"ordinary" fraud and deceit cases. In that case plaintiff was induced to purchase
defendant's business through misrepresentations made by the defendant, but
the Court expressly found that there was "nothing to indicate malice toward
the plaintiff," 5 an element that has always been necessary for the awarding of
punitive damages generally. 6 The Court in Oehlhoj may be said to have had in
contemplation just such a situation as that presented by the instant case, when
it declared that the "rule" should be adhered to except perhaps where the
wrong involves some violation of duty springing from a relation of trust or
confidence, or presents other extraordinary or exceptional circumstances,
clearly indicating malice and calling for an extension of the doctrine."7 (Emphasis added.)
The majority has not sought to change the rule as it has been applied
to "ordinary" fraud and deceit actions in New York, but has merely distinguished the instant case from these and specifically held that "there may be
a recovery of exemplary damages in fraud and deceit actions where the fraud,
aimed at the public generally, is gross and involves high moral culpability." 8
12 A.D.2d 456, 207 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1st Dep't 1960).
3. Walker v. Sheldon, supra note 1, at 404, 179 N.E.2d 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
4. 73 App. Div. 329, 76 N.Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1902).
2.

S. Id. at 335, 76 N.Y. Supp. at 720.

6. 1 Clark, New York Law of Damages § 51 (1925); McCormack, Damages § 79

(1935).

7. Oehlhof v. Solomon, supra note 4, at 334, 76 N.Y. Supp. at 720.
8. Walker v. Sheldon, supra note 1, at 405, 179 N.E.2d 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
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This view is in substantial agreement with the weight of case authority
in the United States9 and the text writers,' 0 and the Court has pointed out that
punitive damages have been given in New York in a fraud and deceit action
where the malicious conduct of the defendant has shown a reprehensible degree
of moral turpitude and a callous, almost criminal, indifference to civil obligations."
In a dissenting opinion by Judge Van Voorhis, in which Judges Froessel
and Foster concurred, it was vigorously argued that the awarding of punitive
damages should not be extended to fraud and deceit actions. A "time honored"
rule was noted that confined such damages to the actual pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff;' 2 and the majority has pointed out that this is indeed
the rule, and remains as such, in cases involving "ordinary" fraud. In none of
the cases cited by the minority did the facts involve wanton or malicious
conduct directed not only at the plaintiff, but as alleged in the instant case,
the public generally, and the case of Oehlhoj v. Solomon, cited by the minority
in support of this "time-honored" rule, clearly indicates that an extension of
this rule, or more properly perhaps in the instant case, an exception to that rule,
was foreseen when the elements of malice and wanton conduct warranted it.
It is difficult to justify the apprehension of the minority. Underlying the
reasons given for this uneasiness is a fear of excessive and arbitrary awards that
may be "obtained by a plaintiff by inflaming the passions of the jury."'1
Yet such awards, while in the "sound discretion" of the jury, do not go unchecked by the courts, but are, as the majority opinion notes, subject to court
review. The difficulty in formulating a rule or doctrine allowing punitive
damages in fraud and deceit actions is apparent at first glance, but the holding
in the instant case is a narrow one and should not, when applied, admit of the
confusion and arbitrariness which the minority fears. In addition to requiring the
elements of malice and wanton conduct, the majority clearly limits its holding
to a fact situation which involves fraud and deceit upon the public generally
by a defendant whose business is based upon such deception. Wisely distinguished is the "isolated transaction incident to an otherwise legitimate
4
business."'
9. See, e.g., Bell v. Preferred Life Soc., 320 U.S. 238 (1943); Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. 362 (1851); Greene v. Keithley, 86 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1936); Laughlin v. Hopkinson,
292 11. 80, 126 N.E. 591 (1920); Whitehead v. Allen, 63 N.M. 63, 313 P.2d 335 (1957);
Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946); Craig v. Spitzer Motors,
109 Ohio App. 376, 160 N.E.2d 537 (1959).
10. 1 Clark, New York Law of Damages § 62 (1925); McCormick, Damages § 78
(1935); Prosser, Torts § 2 (1st ed. 1941).
11. See Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176, 44 N.E. 773 (1896), where the plaintiff
was induced to marry a domestic in the employ of the defendant's family who had been
represented by the defendant to be a "virtuous and respectable woman." Undisclosed, however, was the fact that she had been made pregnant by the defendant. See, also, Hamilton
v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 53 N.Y. 25 (1873).
12. Sager v. Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E.2d 971 (1936); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y.
546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919).
13. Walker v. Sheldon, supra note 1, at 408, 179 N.E.2d 501, 223 N.Y.S.2d 494.
14. Id. at 406, 179 N.E.2d 500, 223 N.Y.S.2d 492.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It would seem that a more steadfast faith in the ability of those who sit
in judgment of the facts in civil cases, and in the judicial safeguards erected
to insure the equality of such verdicts, would work to dispel at least some of
the misgivings of the minority. There is no doubt that the awarding of punitive
damages in a fraud and deceit action such as the instant case takes on an aura
of criminal punishment being meted out in a civil court. There is the further
possibility that the defendant may yet have another day in court, this time
criminal, in which further penalties may be exacted. But this possibility may
well be risked if the interests of both parties to an action such as the instant
case are weighed with equal vigor, as the majority has done. It is decidedly
less likely that grave injustice would be done to a defendant in the present
situation if he were in fact subjected to monetary damages in excess of the
actual amount realized by his fraudulent scheme, than if a plaintiff similar
to the one in the instant case were rendered a sum equal to the amount
actually parted with, but which in view of the expenses necessary to realize
such a verdict could well be considered to be something less than "compensatory" in practical terms. The majority has recognized the value in providing
such a plaintiff with a realistic measure of self-interest in order to induce
him to initiate a claim which otherwise might be neglected. The net result
of this view would seem to be a just one, fraught as it may be with some risk
of dual punishment for the defendant or a judicial encroachment upon a
legislative function (the imposition of punishment to deter crime). Clearly,
then, the majority has struck a balance which is not as unworkable as might
be feared.
A dutiful consideration of the public welfare recommends this holding
which provides a powerful deterrent to any illegitimate enterprise based upon
fraud and deception, which could otherwise afford to suffer its occasional day
in court if only compensatory damages were to be involved in the few civil
actions likely to be brought against it. Equally important and not to be overlooked, is the very real opportunity of creating a more favorable climate for
the legitimate business community through the resultant removal of such
enterprises.
J.P.M.
GRATUITOUS MEDICAL

Am

NOT COMPENSABLE AS TORT DAMAGES

Plaintiff is a practicing physician. In July, 1957, the auto driven by him
was struck from the rear by an auto operated by defendant. For the resulting
cervical whiplash injury, plaintiff received medical services from professional
colleagues and physiotherapy by his nurse, in each instance without out-ofpocket expense. On appeal, it was held, affirmed, that the value of medical
and nursing care and treatment rendered to the injured physician gratuitously
was not recoverable as special damages irrespective of any moral obligation on

